Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations

DOI10.1093/QJE/QJS026MaRDI QIDQ4962988zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard T. Holden, Takashi Kunimoto, Olivier Tercieux

Publication date 6 November 2018

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1995

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form mechanisminformation perturbations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(25)

• Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory
• Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
• Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games
• Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
• Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
• Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
• Noncontractible investments and reference points
• Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
• Efficient investments in the implementation problem
• One-step-ahead implementation
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
• Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
• Full implementation in backward induction
• Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
• Continuous level-k mechanism design
• Perfect implementation
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Direct implementation with evidence
• An ordinal solution to King Solomon's dilemma
• Robust implementation with costly information
• Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
• Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition

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