Compellingness in Nash implementation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2026.02.008MaRDI QIDQ7297053zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Shurojit Chatterji, Takashi Kunimoto, P. Ramos

Publication date 15 July 2026

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2026.02.008

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

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• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
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• Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
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• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Rationalizable implementation
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
• Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
• Sequential commitment games
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

Cited in

(1)

• Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in majority voting

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