Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)
- Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer
- The endowment game when \(n = 2\)
- Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Epsilon-Nash implementation
- Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
- A dictatorial domain for monotone social choice functions
- Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
- Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
- Private information in large economies
- Structural instability of the core
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
- Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
- Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
- Implementation via backward induction
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Walrasian social choice in a large economy
- Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
- The revelation approach to Nash implementation
- Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
- A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information
- Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
- Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The no envy approach to compensation
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
- Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
- An equal right solution to the compensation-reponsibility dilemma
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
- Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
- Walrasian and constrained Walrasian correspondences and Nash implementation
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- A characterization of egalitarian equivalence
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
- New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation
- On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Privacy in implementation
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Strategic vote trading under complete information
- Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
- Nash implementation in production economies
- A note on the extension of a binary relation on a set to the power set
- Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
- Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
- Virtual repeated implementation
- Implementing a surplus division rule
- Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
- Nash implementation of the majority rule
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
- On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
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