New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.12.009MaRDI QIDQ1672864zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hideki Mizukami, Takuma Wakayama

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.009

zbMATH Keywords

deferred acceptance algorithmdominant strategy implementationNash implementationrestricted monotonicityschool choicesecure implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility

Cited in

(1)

• Strategy-proof mechanism design with boundedly rational agents: theory and experiment

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