Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.006MaRDI QIDQ472193zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Alejandro Saporiti

Publication date 19 November 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/economics/discussionpapers/EDP-1402.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

partial honestyrectangularityrepresentative (median) votersecure implementationsingle-crossing preferencesstrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

Cited in

(22)

• New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation
• Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
• Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
• Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
• An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions
• A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
• A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
• On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
• On the implementation of the median
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6519655 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation with partial provability
• Secure implementation in production economies
• Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
• Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
• Honesty and epistemological implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information
• Strategy-proof mechanism design with boundedly rational agents: theory and experiment
• Strong Nash implementation and economic applications

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