A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5556709 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
- A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies
- On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
- Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
- Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model
- Strategy-proof location of public facilities
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
Cited in
(9)- The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
- Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness
- On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
- Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
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