Strategy-proof location on a network
From MaRDI portal
Publication:697960
DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2807zbMATH Open1027.91022OpenAlexW1970301801MaRDI QIDQ697960FDOQ697960
Authors: James Schummer, Rakesh V. Vohra 
Publication date: 18 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1253.pdf
Recommendations
- An Axiomatic Approach to Location on Networks
- scientific article
- Network location of a reliable center using the most reliable route policy
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1394671
- Competitive Location on a Network
- Competitive location on a network
- Strategyproof facility location with limited locations
- Strategy-proof location functions on finite graphs
- Location-allocation on congested networks
Individual preferences (91B08) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- The replacement principle and tree structured preferences
- The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
- Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces
- Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
Cited In (55)
- The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks
- Multiple facility location games with envy ratio
- Strategy-proof location of public facilities
- Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains
- A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Strategyproof facility location with limited locations
- Multiple facility location games with envy ratio
- Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
- Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
- Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
- Walking in circles
- Parameterization of strategy-proof mechanisms in the obnoxious facility game
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains
- Heterogeneous facility location without money
- A survey on approximation mechanism design without money for facility games
- Approximation strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility location on a line
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- Trade-offs on the location of the core node in a network
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Two-facility location games with a minimum distance requirement on a circle
- Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs
- Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Multiwinner Elections and Structural Results
- Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria
- Strategy-proof mechanism for obnoxious facility location on a line
- Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem
- Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions
- Approximate mechanism design for distributed facility location
- Facility location games with distinct desires
- Strategy-proof location functions on finite graphs
- Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
- Constrained heterogeneous facility location games with max-variant cost
- The target location function on finite trees
- Mechanism and network design with private negative externalities
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- Constrained heterogeneous two-facility location games with max-variant cost
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
- Condorcet winners for public goods
- False-name-proof facility location on discrete structures
- Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle
- Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
- Two-facility location games with minimum distance requirement
- Constrained heterogeneous two-facility location games with sum-variant
- Group strategy-proof rules in multidimensional binary domains
- Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources
- Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
- Two homogeneous facility location games with a minimum distance requirement on a circle
This page was built for publication: Strategy-proof location on a network
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q697960)
