Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.110164MaRDI QIDQ2069957zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sarvesh Bandhu, Bishwajyoti Mondal, Anup Pramanik

Publication date 21 January 2022

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110164

zbMATH Keywords

conflicting preference domainsstrategy-proofnessunanimity with status-quo rulesvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
• Circular domains
• Dictatorial domains
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Further results on dictatorial domains
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
• Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
• Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
• Single-peaked orders on a tree
• Strategy-proof location on a network
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
• Voting by Committees

Cited in

(12)

• Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
• The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness
• Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives
• Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
• Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains
• An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems
• Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
• Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
• An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
• A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population
• Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains
• A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model

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