Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
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Publication:2462283
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.03.006zbMath1271.91050OpenAlexW3092429321MaRDI QIDQ2462283
Publication date: 30 November 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/16-2006-cah.pdf
strategy-proofnesspopulation-monotonicitystatus quosolidaritypublic decisionreplacement-dominationcoalition-strategy-proofness
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