Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences

DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01245-3MaRDI QIDQ826606zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bettina Klaus, Panos Protopapas

Publication date 6 January 2021

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hec.unil.ch/attachments/deep/series/2016/17.13.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

population-monotonicityreplacement-dominancesingle-peaked preferencestarget point functionstarget set correspondences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Solidarity with respect to small changes in preferences in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• Target rules for public choice economies on tree networks and in Euclidean spaces
• Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options
• Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle
• Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.

Cites work

• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• An introduction to decision theory.
• Choice under complete uncertainty: Axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44382 (Why is no real title available?)
• Locating libraries on a street
• Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
• Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
• On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
• Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
• Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle
• Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo
• Solidarity with respect to small changes in preferences in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
• Target rules for public choice economies on tree networks and in Euclidean spaces
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
• The replacement principle and tree structured preferences
• The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks
• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains

Cited in

(10)

• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
• On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
• Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
• Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle
• Choice correspondences for public goods
• Solidarity with respect to small changes in preferences in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• Generalized target functions on trees
• Target rules for public choice economies on tree networks and in Euclidean spaces
• Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains

This page was built for publication: Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q826606)