Solidarity with respect to small changes in preferences in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
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Cites work
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Can everyone benefit from growth ? Two difficulties
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies
- Intergenerational egalitarianism
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
- Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
- The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks
- The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
- Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
Cited in
(7)- The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
- Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
- Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle
- Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
- Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
- Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo
- Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences
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