When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
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Publication:2859067
DOI10.3982/ECTA9454zbMath1274.91157OpenAlexW1489626346MaRDI QIDQ2859067
Publication date: 6 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9454
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