An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
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Publication:1682703
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.013zbMath1414.91132OpenAlexW2753277740MaRDI QIDQ1682703
Publication date: 5 December 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.013
Related Items (3)
Evaluationwise strategy-proofness ⋮ Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness ⋮ Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
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