A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice
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Publication:2341125
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0846-3zbMath1318.91069OpenAlexW3123232297WikidataQ59755938 ScholiaQ59755938MaRDI QIDQ2341125
Publication date: 23 April 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0846-3
Related Items (3)
Bounded response of aggregated preferences ⋮ An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions ⋮ Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
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