A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems
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Publication:4865750
DOI10.2307/2298113zbMath0845.90019OpenAlexW2044446338MaRDI QIDQ4865750
Matthew O. Jackson, Sanjay Srivastava
Publication date: 28 February 1996
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298113
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