Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
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Cites work
- A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems
- A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
- A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
- Exact implementation
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Rationalizability in general situations
- Rationalizable implementation
- Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- To err is human: implementation in quantal response equilibria
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
Cited in
(16)- Rational budgeters in the theory of social choice
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Implementation without rationality assumptions
- The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795159 (Why is no real title available?)
- Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
- Rationalizable implementation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 970203 (Why is no real title available?)
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- Interim rationalizable implementation of functions
- Two-player rationalizable implementation
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