Rationalizability in general situations
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Publication:2634140
DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0882-yzbMath1367.91034OpenAlexW214656778MaRDI QIDQ2634140
Xiao Luo, Yi-Chun Chen, Chen Qu
Publication date: 8 February 2016
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0882-y
Related Items (8)
An epistemic characterization of MACA ⋮ Rationalizable strategies in games with incomplete preferences ⋮ Iterated bounded dominance ⋮ Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences ⋮ Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies ⋮ Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge
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