Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
From MaRDI portal
Publication:423741
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.004zbMath1239.91016MaRDI QIDQ423741
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10533/130661
rational expectations; eductive stability; expectational coordination; non-atomic games; rationalizable strategies; strong rationality
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
Related Items
On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization, On the space of players in idealized limit games, Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer, Rationalizability and mixed strategies in large games, Iterated elimination procedures, Rationalizability in large games, Rationalizability in general situations
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities
- Determinacy and stability under learning of rational expectations equilibria
- Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
- Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets
- On a theorem of Schmeidler
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- An elementary proof that integration preserves uppersemicontinuity
- Rationalizability, strong rationality, and expectational stability
- A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
- On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
- Local coordination and market equilibria.
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
- Iterated strict dominance in general games
- Integrals of set-valued functions
- Coordination on saddle-path solutions: the eductive viewpoint -- linear multivariate models
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- The Many Faces of Rationalizability
- On Cournot-Nash Equilibria in Generalized Qualitative Games with an Atomless Measure Space of Agents
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Coordinating Regime Switches
- Variational Analysis
- COORDINATION ON SADDLE-PATH SOLUTIONS: THE EDUCTIVE VIEWPOINT—LINEAR UNIVARIATE MODELS
- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
- Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
- Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
