scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1396804
This book deals with the macroeconomic meaning and implications of the existence of various kinds of equilibria in economic games. It brings into light theoretical models and carefully done experiments which show how players coordinate their behavior in order to reach efficiently equilibrated decisions. Without being a mathematical book ``Coordination games should be carefully studied by mathematicians interested in game theory. It presents a conceptual framework in which mathematical notions evolve into decision making tools. After an introduction to complementarities and a discussion of experimental research concerning the outcomes of coordination games, the author studies models of economies with complementarities, economies with imperfectly competitive markets and, the most interesting of all, models emphasizing the role of government in the process of inter-player coordination at macroeconomic level. The elegance of the models and their analysis compensates for the less styled presentation of the mathematics on which some conclusions are based. The book suggests the need of re-thinking the way in which competition and cooperation are represented in the mathematical game theory. The fact that in competitive economies players tend to coordinate strategic decisions in the name of efficiency blurs the distinction between cooperation and competition so deeply embedded in the mathematical theory of games.
- Continua of underemployment equilibria reflecting coordination failures, also at Walrasian prices
- Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game.
- Extended nonlinear feedback model for describing episodes of high inflation
- Coordination and private information revelation
- Public debt and fiscal policy traps
- Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making
- Strategic complements, substitutes, and Ambiguity: the implications for public goods.
- Financial collapse: a lesson from the great depression.
- Precedent transfer in coordination games: an experiment
- Symmetry-breaking in two-player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity: a synthesis
- Incentive-based search for equilibria in Boolean games
- Equilibrium with computationally constrained agents
- Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination
- Interaction patterns and coordination in two population groups: a dynamic perspective
- General complementarities on complete partial orders
- Coordination need not be a problem
- Quantum prisoner's dilemma in a restricted one-parameter strategic space
- Sensitivity analysis of boundary equilibria
- A Leviathan central bank: modeling seigniorage in a money search model
- The supermodularity of the tax competition game
- Coordination of mobile labor
- Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games
- Dynamic R\& D with strategic behavior
- Equilibrium and government commitment
- Identification of binary choice models with social interactions
- Financial Bubbles: A Learning Effect Modelling Approach
- Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
- Strategic interaction and dynamics under endogenous time preference
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 46529 (Why is no real title available?)
- Stochastically stable equilibria in n-person binary coordination games
- Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6984274 (Why is no real title available?)
- Evolutionary dynamics in discrete time for the perturbed positive definite replicator equation
- Monotone games. A unified approach to games with strategic complements and substitutes
- Finite-size effects and switching times for Moran process with mutation
- ARE LONG‐RUN PRICE STABILITY AND SHORT‐RUN OUTPUT STABILIZATION ALL THAT MONETARY POLICY CAN AIM FOR?
- Coordination problems on networks revisited: statics and dynamics
- Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria
- Coordination and information: Recent experimental evidence
- The optimal way to play the most difficult repeated two-player coordination games
- Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation
- Strategic behaviour and manipulation resistance in peer-to-peer, crowdsourced information gathering
- Insights from Ising models of land-use under economic coordination incentives
- Discrete preference games with logic-based agents: formal framework, complexity, and islands of tractability
- The optimal way to play the most difficult repeated coordination games
- Coordination with sequential information acquisition
- Reward function design method to achieve system-level objectives in ambulance diversion problem
- Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
- Supermodularity and incentive reversal in teams
- Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
- The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance
- Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
- Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation
- Money illusion and coordination failure
- Information acquisition in global games of regime change
- Coordination cycles
- Indeterminacy, sunspots, and development traps
- Symmetric versus asymmetric equilibria in symmetric supermodular games
- When can changes in expectations cause business cycle fluctuations in neo-classical settings?
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