Strategic behaviour and manipulation resistance in peer-to-peer, crowdsourced information gathering
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Publication:6110063
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.04.002zbMath1520.91154OpenAlexW4366167729MaRDI QIDQ6110063
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Publication date: 31 July 2023
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.04.002
Cites Work
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