Voting rules as statistical estimators
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2452267
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0619-1zbMath1287.91051MaRDI QIDQ2452267
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30292/1/MPRA_paper_30292.pdf
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Strategic behaviour and manipulation resistance in peer-to-peer, crowdsourced information gathering, Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules, Variable-population voting rules, Scoring rules for judgment aggregation, Metric rationalization of social welfare functions, Judgment aggregation in search for the truth, Condorcet meets Bentham, Distance rationalization of voting rules, Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence, Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond, Majority rule in the absence of a majority, Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues, Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
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