Voting rules as statistical estimators

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0619-1zbMATH Open1287.91051OpenAlexW2115073724MaRDI QIDQ2452267FDOQ2452267

Authors: Marcus Pivato 

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30292/1/MPRA_paper_30292.pdf

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited In (35)

• Majority rule in the absence of a majority
• Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
• Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
• Nonparametric predictive reliability of series of voting systems
• How Often Are You Decisive: an Enquiry About the Pivotality of Voting Rules
• The learnability of voting rules
• Social choice rules driven by propositional logic
• Metric rationalization of social welfare functions
• Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
• Meritocracy voting: measuring the unmeasurable
• Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence
• Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?
• Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
• A distance-based comparison of basic voting rules
• Statistical comparison of aggregation rules for votes
• Probabilistic Borda rule voting
• Eliciting a suitable voting rule via examples
• Voting rules as error-correcting codes
• General representation of epistemically optimal procedures
• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
• Systems, Procedures and Voting Rules in Context
• Condorcet meets Bentham
• Voting Behavior Through Entropy Approach
• Voting Rules from Random Relations
• Maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation with variable probabilities
• Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
• Rationalizations of Voting Rules
• Strategic behaviour and manipulation resistance in peer-to-peer, crowdsourced information gathering
• Predicting winner and estimating margin of victory in elections using sampling
• Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond
• Social choice, optimal inference and figure skating
• Variable-population voting rules
• Distance rationalization of voting rules

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