Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2288166
Abstract: We explore the relation between two natural symmetry properties of voting rules. The first is transitive-symmetry -- the property of invariance to a transitive permutation group -- while the second is the "unbiased" property of every voter having the same influence for all i.i.d. probability measures. We show that these properties are distinct by two constructions -- one probabilistic, one explicit -- of rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric.
Recommendations
- Symmetry breaking for voting mechanisms
- The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
- Voting Rules from Random Relations
- Optimal voting rules
- Dynamically consistent voting rules
- On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
- On some incompatible properties of voting schemes
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- Equitable Voting Rules
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
Cites work
Cited in
(6)
This page was built for publication: Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2288166)