Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric

DOI10.37236/8795zbMATH Open1432.91045arXiv1907.01685OpenAlexW2999212800MaRDI QIDQ2288166FDOQ2288166

Authors: Aadyot Bhatnagar 

Publication date: 17 January 2020

Published in: The Electronic Journal of Combinatorics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We explore the relation between two natural symmetry properties of voting rules. The first is transitive-symmetry -- the property of invariance to a transitive permutation group -- while the second is the "unbiased" property of every voter having the same influence for all i.i.d. probability measures. We show that these properties are distinct by two constructions -- one probabilistic, one explicit -- of rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.01685

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zbMATH Keywords

voting ruleswinning coalitiongraphic voting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Random regular graphs of high degree
• Nearly perfect matchings in regular simple hypergraphs
• Homogeneous Games. II
• On the asymmetry of random regular graphs and random graphs
• Equitable Voting Rules

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• Symmetric majority rules
• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
• Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules
• Equitable Voting Rules
• Voting Rules from Random Relations
• Symmetry breaking for voting mechanisms

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