Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
This paper provides two different proofs of existence of binary voting rules which are unbiased, in the sense that every voter has the same influence for every independent identically distributed probability distribution, but not transitive-symmetric, in the sense that, for every pair of voters \(u\) and \(v\), there is an automorphism \(\sigma\) such that \(\sigma(u)=v\). First, a probabilistic proof that there exist voting rules that are unbiased and, besides not transitive-symmetric, also totally asymmetric, in the sense of having no nontrivial automorphisms. In a second approach, a class of voting rule is built that is unbiased, but neither transitive-symmetric nor totally asymmetric. The result holds for voting rules \(\Phi\) that are odd, i.e. such that \(\Phi(-x)=-\Phi(x)\), and monotone, i.e. such that \(\Phi(x)>\Phi(x0)\) whenever \(x>x0\) coordinate-wise.
- Symmetry breaking for voting mechanisms
- The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
- Voting Rules from Random Relations
- Optimal voting rules
- Dynamically consistent voting rules
- On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
- On some incompatible properties of voting schemes
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- Equitable Voting Rules
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
This page was built for publication: Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2288166)
