Dynamically consistent voting rules

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.012MaRDI QIDQ893404zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Madhav Chandrasekher

Publication date 19 November 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.012

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessdynamic consistencyaggregation of preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• An extension of Bowen's dynamic voting rule to many dimensions
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Cites work

• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
• Voting under constraints

Cited in

(12)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747925 (Why is no real title available?)
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• The Efron dice voting system
• Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
• Equitable Voting Rules
• Voting Rules from Random Relations
• Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
• Best reply dynamics for scoring rules
• Communication compatible voting rules
• Rationalizations of Voting Rules
• Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains
• A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings

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