Dynamically consistent voting rules

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.012zbMATH Open1369.91052OpenAlexW1267729134MaRDI QIDQ893404FDOQ893404

Authors: Madhav Chandrasekher 

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.012

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zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessdynamic consistencyaggregation of preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• Voting under constraints

Cited In (11)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• The Efron dice voting system
• Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
• Equitable Voting Rules
• Voting Rules from Random Relations
• Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
• Communication compatible voting rules
• Rationalizations of Voting Rules
• Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains
• A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings

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