Voting under constraints
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Publication:1371133
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2301zbMath0892.90007OpenAlexW2002196310MaRDI QIDQ1371133
Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 5 January 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2301
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Cites Work
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- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
