Voting under constraints

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2301zbMath0892.90007MaRDI QIDQ1371133

Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 5 January 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2301

zbMATH Keywords

intersection property; impossibility theorems; strategy-proof mechanisms; median voter principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Abstract Arrowian aggregation, The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces, Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges, Efficiency and income redistribution in the single-peaked preferences model with several commodities, Strategy-proofness and ``median voters, The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm, The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences, Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization, Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods, Voting by committees under constraints, Separable discrete preferences

Cites Work

• Generalized median social welfare functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule