Voting under constraints
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Publication:1371133
DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2301zbMATH Open0892.90007OpenAlexW2002196310MaRDI QIDQ1371133FDOQ1371133
Authors: Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 5 January 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2301
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Cites Work
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- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Voting by Committees
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
- Generalized median social welfare functions
Cited In (57)
- Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
- Belief-independence and (robust) strategy-proofness
- Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function
- Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise
- Use of intersection property for analysis of feasibility of multicriteria expertise results
- Social Choice Theory
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Ultimate fate of constrained voters
- Majority rule in the absence of a majority
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains
- Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
- Optimal voting rules
- The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- Arrow's theorem as a corollary
- Abstract Arrowian aggregation
- Voting on Actions with Uncertain Outcomes
- Random dictatorship domains
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- Tops-only domains
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Efficiency and income redistribution in the single-peaked preferences model with several commodities
- Voting with preferences over margins of victory
- Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- Strategy-proof voting scheme under single-peak preference
- On the implementation of the median
- Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
- On strategy-proof direct mechanism of active expertise over strictly convex compact set
- Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
- Dynamically consistent voting rules
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Salvador Barberà
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Conformity in voting
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Separable discrete preferences
- Voting with Limited Information and Many Alternatives
- Rationalizable voting
- A note on nondictatorial conditions for choice mechanisms
- A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms
- The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
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