Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules

DOI10.3982/TE1111MaRDI QIDQ4586099zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tilman Börgers, Doug Smith

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1111

zbMATH Keywords

robust mechanism designGibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(13)

• Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
• On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
• Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
• (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
• What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?
• Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
• On robust constitution design
• Robust dynamic implementation
• On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators
• Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
• Invariance to representation of information
• Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching

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