Invariance to representation of information
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Publication:894617
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.09.004zbMATH Open1347.91018OpenAlexW2191255066MaRDI QIDQ894617FDOQ894617
Authors: Muhamet Yildiz 
Publication date: 2 December 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/119221
Recommendations
Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Interactive epistemology. II: Probability
- Interactive epistemology and solution concepts for games with asymmetric information
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information
- Topology-free typology of beliefs
- Games of incomplete information, ergodic theory, and the measurability of equilibria
- Axiomatic equilibrium selection for generic two-player games
- On Forward Induction
- Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
Cited In (5)
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