Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games
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Publication:2402817
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.07.002zbMath1394.91065OpenAlexW2737985359MaRDI QIDQ2402817
Jonathan Weinstein, Muhamet Yildiz
Publication date: 14 September 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.07.002
Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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