Rationalizability in continuous games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.004zbMath1232.91066OpenAlexW3122285911MaRDI QIDQ617599

Itai Arieli

Publication date: 21 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp495.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilitycontinuous games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items

Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games ⋮ Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ Rationalizability in large games ⋮ Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies ⋮ Iterated dominance revisited

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