Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2294124
DOI10.1007/s00199-018-1142-8zbMath1432.91027OpenAlexW2646934929WikidataQ129367601 ScholiaQ129367601MaRDI QIDQ2294124
Pierpaolo Battigalli, Pietro Tebaldi
Publication date: 10 February 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:602
Related Items (5)
Epistemic game theory without types structures: an application to psychological games ⋮ Two-period pricing and utilization decisions in a dual-channel service-only supply chain ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games ⋮ Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Rationalizability in continuous games
- Dynamic psychological games
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Topology-free typology of beliefs
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms
- Rationalizability in general situations
- Forward induction reasoning revisited
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning
- Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
- A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
- RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
- Groups of Automorphisms of Borel Spaces
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Extensions of Measures and the Von Neumann Selection Theorem
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
This page was built for publication: Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies