Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
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Publication:2294124
DOI10.1007/S00199-018-1142-8zbMATH Open1432.91027OpenAlexW2646934929WikidataQ129367601 ScholiaQ129367601MaRDI QIDQ2294124FDOQ2294124
Authors: Pierpaolo Battigalli, Pietro Tebaldi 
Publication date: 10 February 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:602
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Cited In (12)
- Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
- The Best of All PossibleWorlds: Where Interrogative Games Meet Research Agendas
- A dynamic analysis of interactive rationality
- Epistemic models of shallow depths and decision making in games: Horticulture
- Dynamic interactive epistemology
- Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
- Two-period pricing and utilization decisions in a dual-channel service-only supply chain
- Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
- Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games
- An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness
- Complete conditional type structures
- Epistemic game theory without types structures: an application to psychological games
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