Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.014zbMATH Open1393.91002OpenAlexW3124082060MaRDI QIDQ2013383FDOQ2013383

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2066.pdf

Recommendations

• A Note on Rationalizability and Restrictions on Beliefs
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zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationBayes correlated equilibriumbelief-free rationalizabilityinformational robustnessinterim correlated rationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
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• Interactive epistemology and solution concepts for games with asymmetric information
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• Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
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• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Intrinsic correlation in games
• On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
• Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
• Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
• Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Impact of higher-order uncertainty
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction
• Proximity of Information in Games with Incomplete Information
• Tight Revenue Bounds With Possibilistic Beliefs and Level-k Rationality
• Rationalizable trade

Cited In (13)

• An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation
• Order independence for rationalizability
• Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games
• The positive value of information
• Econometric inference on a large Bayesian game with heterogeneous beliefs
• RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
• Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
• Stable outcomes and information in games: an empirical framework
• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
• Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: the role of tie-breaking rules
• Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On rationalizability in games with private values
• Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
• Informational robustness of common belief in rationality

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