Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
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Publication:867138
DOI10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3zbMath1201.91021OpenAlexW3122376819MaRDI QIDQ867138
Publication date: 14 February 2007
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3
Related Items (17)
A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection ⋮ Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria ⋮ Information design in multistage games ⋮ Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence ⋮ Cheap talk with coarse understanding ⋮ Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games ⋮ Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness ⋮ Signaling and mediation in games with common interests ⋮ Games in context: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions ⋮ Informational robustness of common belief in rationality ⋮ Interim partially correlated rationalizability ⋮ Risk-neutral equilibria of noncooperative games
Cites Work
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: A model with verifiable types
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Universal Mechanisms
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Joint Coherence in Games of Incomplete Information
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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