Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
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Publication:1810426
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00011-XzbMath1048.91023MaRDI QIDQ1810426
Publication date: 9 June 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication, Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited, Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players, Signaling Games, Mechanism design and communication networks, Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring, Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals, Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information, Perfect implementation, A detail-free mediator, Secure message transmission on directed networks, Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information., Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games, Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication, Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information, Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games, Incentives and the structure of communication, Long persuasion games, Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types, A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions, Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games, Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol, Unnamed Item, Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information, RULE RATIONALITY, Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
Cites Work
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- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
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- Strategic Information Revelation
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
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