Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types
From MaRDI portal
Publication:533921
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.10.001zbMath1211.91075OpenAlexW1989604858MaRDI QIDQ533921
Publication date: 10 May 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.10.001
Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Cites Work
- Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
- Long persuasion games
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Universal Mechanisms
- Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
- Distributed computing meets game theory
- Bridging Game Theory and Cryptography: Recent Results and Future Directions
- Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information
- Long Cheap Talk
- Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
- Rationality and Adversarial Behavior in Multi-party Computation
This page was built for publication: Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types