Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.10.001zbMath1211.91075OpenAlexW1989604858MaRDI QIDQ533921

P. Achim Wagner

Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.10.001

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian gamecertification equilibriumunmediated communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
• Long persuasion games
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Universal Mechanisms
• Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Distributed computing meets game theory
• Bridging Game Theory and Cryptography: Recent Results and Future Directions
• Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information
• Long Cheap Talk
• Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
• Rationality and Adversarial Behavior in Multi-party Computation

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