Long persuasion games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.02.006zbMATH Open1151.91317OpenAlexW3125880996MaRDI QIDQ960240FDOQ960240

Françoise Forges, Frédéric Koessler

Publication date: 16 December 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.006

Recommendations

• A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Sequential persuasion
• MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
• Dynamic persuasion

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkpersuasionsequential rationalitybelief consistencydiconvexificationdimartingaledisclosure of certifiable informationjointly controlled lotterieslong conversationverifiable types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions.
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Long Cheap Talk
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Universal Mechanisms
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Bi-convexity and bi-martingales
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information

Cited In (16)

• Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification
• Sequential Bayesian persuasion
• Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types
• Dynamic persuasion
• Waiting to Persuade
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Persuasion with communication costs
• The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions
• Slow persuasion
• Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
• Implementation with partial provability
• Dynamic strategic information transmission
• Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins
• Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials

This page was built for publication: Long persuasion games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q960240)