Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00016-7MaRDI QIDQ1867025zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert Samuel Simon

Publication date 2 April 2003

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00016-7

zbMATH Keywords

2-person gamesgames in extensive formmultistage and repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3886197 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Bi-convexity and bi-martingales
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
• The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type

Cited in

(6)

• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
• Repeated games with incomplete information
• Long persuasion games
• A Zero-Sum Game with Incomplete Information and Compact Action Spaces
• Sender-receiver games with cooperation
• Equilibrium existence and topology in some repeated games with incomplete information

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