Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example

DOI10.2307/2937792zbMath0695.90018MaRDI QIDQ3471801

Françoise Forges

Publication date: 1990

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2937792

zbMATH Keywords

information transmission; communication equilibrium payoffs; conversation game; signaling steps

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B60: Trade models

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

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