Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example

DOI10.2307/2937792zbMath0695.90018OpenAlexW2144725035MaRDI QIDQ3471801

Françoise Forges

Publication date: 1990

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2937792

zbMATH Keywords

information transmissioncommunication equilibrium payoffsconversation gamesignaling steps

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (26)

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games ⋮ Smoothed Analysis of Local Search Algorithms ⋮ The communication cost of selfishness ⋮ Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects ⋮ A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information ⋮ Goodwill in communication ⋮ Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games ⋮ Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Long information design ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games ⋮ A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games ⋮ Splitting games over finite sets ⋮ Strategic information exchange ⋮ Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication ⋮ Refining cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ Sender-receiver games with cooperation ⋮ The value of mediated communication ⋮ Long persuasion games ⋮ Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion ⋮ The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication ⋮ MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES ⋮ Designing communication hierarchies ⋮ Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions.

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