A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0537zbMath0873.90130OpenAlexW2117952369MaRDI QIDQ1357400

Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli

Publication date: 10 June 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0537

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumlack of information on one sideone-shot public communication mechanismstwo-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
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• Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
• One-shot public mediated talk
• The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type
• Mediated talk
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

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