A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information
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Publication:1357400
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0537zbMath0873.90130OpenAlexW2117952369MaRDI QIDQ1357400
Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli
Publication date: 10 June 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0537
Nash equilibriumlack of information on one sideone-shot public communication mechanismstwo-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games
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