Recommendations
Cites work
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mediated talk
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Universal Mechanisms
Cited in
(25)- Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation
- Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
- A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information
- Repeated communication through the mechanism \textit{and}
- Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- A note on one-shot public mediated talk.
- Incentives and the structure of communication
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
- Mediated talk
- Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins
- A detail-free mediator
- Universal Mechanisms
- Preface: Special issue in honor of the 60th birthday of Sylvain Sorin
- Correlated equilibria and communication in games
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
- Regularity of the minmax value and equilibria in multiplayer Blackwell games
- A simple model of secure public communication
- Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
- A commitment folk theorem
- A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
- Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game
- Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
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