An Approach to Communication Equilibria
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Learning equilibrium as a generalization of learning to optimize
- Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Can sunspots replace a mediator?
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Speculation and price fluctuations with private, extrinsic signals
- Correlated relaxed equilibria in nonzero-sum linear differential games
- Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
- On the value of information in a strategic conflict
- Computation as a correlation device
- Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games
- Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation
- Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
- Communication, computability, and common interest games
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
- One-shot public mediated talk
- The economic consequences of the peace: Keynes and correlation
- Strategic market games: an introduction.
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets.
- The limit-price mechanism.
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- A note on one-shot public mediated talk.
- Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information
- Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
- Pure communication between agents with close preferences.
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
- Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games
- Incentives and the structure of communication
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
- Games with espionage
- Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations
- Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium
- A communication-proof equilibrium concept
- The value of mediated communication
- Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information
- Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
- A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection
- Goodwill in communication
- Geometry of information structures, strategic measures and associated stochastic control topologies
- Self-rejecting mechanisms
- Cheap talk with coarse understanding
- Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs
- Algorithmic rationality: game theory with costly computation
- Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
- Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
- Correlated equilibria in stochastic games with Borel measurable payoffs
- Information structures and decentralizability of equilibria
- Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
- Deliberative voting
- Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games
- Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
- Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden
- Coordination via correlation: an experimental study
- What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
- Sunspots, correlation and competition
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
- On approximate and weak correlated equilibria in constrained discounted stochastic games
- On the Power of Attribute-Based Communication
- Sequential correlated equilibria in stopping games
- Nash codes for noisy channels
- Strategic Vagueness, and Appropriate Contexts
- Universal Mechanisms
- Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19676 (Why is no real title available?)
- Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
- Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
- Mediated contracts and mechanism design
- A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978460 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978462 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054718 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1508413 (Why is no real title available?)
- Correlated Equilibria in Wireless Power Control Games
- Nash equilibria in games over graphs equipped with a communication mechanism
- Quitting games and linear complementarity problems
- On finding large sets of rewards in two-player ETP-ESP games
- Correlated equilibria and communication in games
- Repeated games with complete information
- How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games
- Honesty and informal agreements
- Long-run strategic advertising and short-run Bertrand competition
- Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information
- Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
- A NOTE ON REPEATED GAMES WITH VANISHING ACTIONS
- Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games
- Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
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