Algorithmic rationality: game theory with costly computation

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Abstract: We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologically appealing explanations of observed behavior in well-studied games (such as finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and rock-paper-scissors). Furthermore, we provide natural conditions on games sufficient to guarantee that equilibria exist.


The article introduces a novel direction in game theory, that of considering computations with a certain cost for the involved players. They also have the option of playing safe and free, but without the possibility of achieving the highest reward. The concepts are nicely introduced through examples, are well explained, but are also accompanied by thoroughly presented, theoretical descriptions. Throughout the article, the reader is often intrigued and challenged by the well-known examples that are adapted to include specific circumstances that help in understanding the presented concepts. Although the article represents a pleasant reading for every researcher in computer science or a connected area, it is more appealing for game theory enthusiasts.



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