Algorithmic rationality: game theory with costly computation
The article introduces a novel direction in game theory, that of considering computations with a certain cost for the involved players. They also have the option of playing safe and free, but without the possibility of achieving the highest reward. The concepts are nicely introduced through examples, are well explained, but are also accompanied by thoroughly presented, theoretical descriptions. Throughout the article, the reader is often intrigued and challenged by the well-known examples that are adapted to include specific circumstances that help in understanding the presented concepts. Although the article represents a pleasant reading for every researcher in computer science or a connected area, it is more appealing for game theory enthusiasts.
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