The Gödelian Foundations of Self-Reference,the Liar and Incompleteness: Arms Racein Complex Strategic Innovation

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_11zbMath1407.91014OpenAlexW2475885193MaRDI QIDQ4606776

Sheri Markose

Publication date: 9 March 2018

Published in: Trends in Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_11

zbMATH Keywords

self-referenceGödel incompletenessnoveltycontrariancreative and productive setsoffline simulationproductive functionred queen-type arms racestrategic innovationsurprise Nash equilibriumsurprises

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Gödel numberings and issues of incompleteness (03F40)

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