The Gödelian foundations of self-reference, the liar and incompleteness: arms race in complex strategic innovation
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_11zbMATH Open1407.91014OpenAlexW2475885193MaRDI QIDQ4606776FDOQ4606776
Authors: Sheri Markose 
Publication date: 9 March 2018
Published in: Trends in Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_11
Recommendations
self-referencenoveltyGödel incompletenesscontrariancreative and productive setsoffline simulationproductive functionred queen-type arms racestrategic innovationsurprise Nash equilibriumsurprises
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