A rational way of playing: revision theory for strategic interaction

DOI10.1007/S10992-017-9433-2zbMATH Open1436.91005OpenAlexW2592078838MaRDI QIDQ722022FDOQ722022

Authors Riccardo Bruni, Giacomo Sillari

Publication date 20 July 2018

Published in Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-017-9433-2

zbMATH Keywords

circular conceptsthe revision theory of truthepistemic foundation (of game theory)social situationsstrategic rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2019842 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795569 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty
• Social software
• Solovay-type theorems for circular definitions
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction

Cited in

(3)

• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Guest editors' introduction
• The Gödelian foundations of self-reference, the liar and incompleteness: arms race in complex strategic innovation

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