A rational way of playing: revision theory for strategic interaction
DOI10.1007/S10992-017-9433-2zbMATH Open1436.91005OpenAlexW2592078838MaRDI QIDQ722022FDOQ722022
Authors: Riccardo Bruni, Giacomo Sillari 
Publication date: 20 July 2018
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-017-9433-2
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Cites Work
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