scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795569

Anil Kumar Gupta, Nuel D. jun. Belnap

Publication date: 11 September 1995

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

theory of truth circular definitions Liar paradox theory of definitions concept of truth behavior of truth circular concept systems of mutually interdependent definitions Tarski biconditionals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to mathematical logic and foundations (03-02)

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