THE MODAL LOGICS OF KRIPKE–FEFERMAN TRUTH

DOI10.1017/JSL.2020.66zbMATH Open1491.03015arXiv2004.07275OpenAlexW3096465156MaRDI QIDQ5000260FDOQ5000260

Johannes Stern, Carlo Nicolai

Publication date: 12 July 2021

Published in: Journal of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results. Given a fixed-point model $mathcalM$, or an axiomatization $S$ thereof, we find a modal logic $M$ such that a modal sentence $varphi$ is a theorem of $M$ if and only if the sentence $varph{i}^{*}$ obtained by translating the modal operator with the truth predicate is true in $mathcalM$ or a theorem of $S$ under all such translations. To this end, we introduce a novel version of possible worlds semantics featuring both classical and nonclassical worlds and establish the completeness of a family of non-congruent modal logics whose internal logic is subclassical with respect to this semantics.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.07275

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zbMATH Keywords

liar paradoxaxiomatic theories of truthmany-valued logicmodal logicnon-classical logicKripke's theory of truthprovability logicKripke-Feferman truthsemantic theoriesSolovay completeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Many-valued logic (03B50)

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Cited In (8)

• A defense the Kripkean account of logical truth in first-order modal logic
• Axiomatizing Kripke's theory of truth
• Toward predicate approaches to modality
• Notes on models of (partial) Kripke-Feferman truth
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The knower paradox in the light of provability interpretations of modal logic
• Systems for non-reflexive consequence
• MODAL MODELS FOR BRADWARDINE'S THEORY OF TRUTH

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