Reflecting on incompleteness
To what extent can mathematical thought be analyzed in formal terms? Gödel's theorems show the inadequacy of single formal systems for this purpose, except in relatively restricted parts of mathematics. However, at the same time they point to the possibility of systematically generating larger and larger systems whose acceptability is implicit in acceptance of the starting theory. The engines for that purpose are what have come to be called reflection principles. These may be iterated into the constructive transfinite, leading to what are called recursive progressions of theories. However, for some years the author had hoped to give a more realistic and perspicuous finite generation procedure. This was first done in a rather special way in 1979 for the characterization of predicativity, which may be regarded as that part of mathematical thought implicit in acceptance of elementary number theory. Now, in this paper, the author presents a new and simple notion of the reflective closure of a schematic theory which can be applied quite generally. First, the author explains the schematic theory \(S(P)\) for an ordinary theory \(S\). For example, schematic Peano arithmetic, denoted PA\((P)\), takes as axioms the usual ones for 0, \('\), \(+\), \(\cdot\) (and possibly further primitive recursive functions) in the base language of arithmetic, together with the principle of induction in the form \[ P(0)\land\forall x(P(x)\to P(x'))\to\forall xP(x), \] where \(P\) is a new ``free predicate symbol or predicate variable. This is accompanied by a rule of formula substitution \[ {A(P)\over A(\hat x B(x))} \] where \(A(\hat x B(x))\) indicates the result of substituting \(B(t)\) for each occurrence of \(P(t)\) in \(A(P)\). Zermelo's set theory in schematic form Z\((P)\) features the principle of separation \[ \forall a\exists b\forall x(x\in b\leftrightarrow x\in a\land P(x)) \] in addition to the usual axioms of extensionality, empty set, etc., again with a rule of substitution. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory may similarly be formulated as a schematic theory ZF\((P)\). Two related notions of reflective closure for schematic \(S(P)\) are introduced in this paper. The first of these is designed to answer the question: which statements in the base language \(L\) of \(S\) \((=S(P)\cdot L)\) ought to be accepted if one has accepted the basic axioms and rules of \(S\)? The answer is given as an ordinary theory \(\text{Ref}(S)\) formulated in a language \(L(T,F)=L\cup(T,F)\), where \(T\) and \(F\) are partial truth and falsity predicates, respectively, which are self- applicable in the sense that they apply to (codes of) statements of \(L(T,F)\). The axioms of \(\text{Ref}(S)\) are those of \(S(P)\) applied to the language \(L(T,F)\) together with an axiom denoted \(\text{Self-Tr Ax}_{L(T,F)}\). The second general notion of reflective closure for schematic \(S(P)\) is proposed as an answer to the question: which schemata \(A(P)\) in the language of \(S(P)\) ought to be accepted if one has accepted the basic (schematic) axioms and rules of \(S(P)\)? The answer is given as a schematic theory \(\text{Ref}^*(S(P))\) formulated in a language \(L(P,T,F)\). The main results of this paper characterize \(\text{Ref}(\)PA) and \(\text{Ref}^*(\)PA\((P))\) in terms of progressions RA\(_ \alpha\) of ramified theories which provided the basis for the first characterization of predicative analysis. It is proved that \(\text{Ref}\)(PA)\(\equiv\) RA\(_{<\varepsilon_ 0}\) and \(\text{Ref}^*(\)PA\((P))\equiv \)RA\(_{<\Gamma_ 0}\).
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