A deflationary account of the truth of the Gödel sentence G

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-10434-8_5zbMATH Open1429.03041OpenAlexW1261777582MaRDI QIDQ5213627FDOQ5213627

Authors: Mario Piazza, Gabriele Pulcini 

Publication date: 4 February 2020

Published in: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10434-8_5

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30)

Cites Work

• Axiomatic theories of truth
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• Reflecting on incompleteness
• How innocent is deflationism?
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• The Goal of Archimedes' Sand Reckoner
• Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories
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• Transfinite Progressions: A Second Look at Completeness
• On interpreting Gödel's second theorem
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Undecidability of the Gödel Sentence and its Truth
• The universal generalization problem
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• A concise introduction to mathematical logic
• Reflections on Concrete Incompleteness
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• What is a proof?

Cited In (10)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Does Gödel's incompleteness theorem prove that truth transcends proof?
• Addendum to ``Sloman's view of Gödel's sentence
• On ``seeing the truth of the Gödel sentence
• Sloman's view of Gödel's sentence
• The implicit commitment of arithmetical theories and its semantic core
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Incompleteness, constructivism and truth
• What’s so Special About the Gödel Sentence $$\mathcal {G}$$ ?
• How do we know that the Gödel sentence of a consistent theory is true?

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