Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Undecidability of the Gödel Sentence and its Truth

DOI10.1007/978-94-007-0214-1_7zbMath1259.03075OpenAlexW151227416MaRDI QIDQ2909753

Daniel Isaacson

Publication date: 6 September 2012

Published in: The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0214-1_7

zbMATH Keywords

Gödel's first incompleteness theoremsoundnessGödel sentence\(\omega\)-consistency1-consistencyrecursively axiomatized theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decidability of theories and sets of sentences (03B25) Gödel numberings and issues of incompleteness (03F40)

Related Items (6)

On constructivity and the Rosser property: a closer look at some Gödelean proofs ⋮ GENERALIZATIONS OF GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS FOR ∑_n-DEFINABLE THEORIES OF ARITHMETIC ⋮ The scope of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem ⋮ CURRENT RESEARCH ON GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS ⋮ A Deflationary Account of the Truth of the Gödel Sentence $$\mathcal{G}$$ ⋮ GÖDEL’S SECOND INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM: HOW IT IS DERIVED AND WHAT IT DELIVERS

This page was built for publication: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Undecidability of the Gödel Sentence and its Truth