GÖDEL’S SECOND INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM: HOW IT IS DERIVED AND WHAT IT DELIVERS
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Publication:4984860
DOI10.1017/bsl.2020.22zbMath1462.03026OpenAlexW3034490412MaRDI QIDQ4984860
Publication date: 21 April 2021
Published in: The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/bsl.2020.22
second incompleteness theoremBoolos' proofChaitin's proofKleene's prooffirst incompleteness theoremRosser's proofGödel's proof
First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30) Gödel numberings and issues of incompleteness (03F40) Algorithmic randomness and dimension (03D32)
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