Reference, paradoxes and truth

DOI10.1007/s11229-008-9392-9zbMath1193.03010OpenAlexW2034396007MaRDI QIDQ2268775

Michał Walicki

Publication date: 9 March 2010

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9392-9

zbMATH Keywords

paradoxself-referenceBoolean equationsassertion operatorinternal theory of truth

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items

On \(\mathcal{F} \)-systems: a graph-theoretic model for paradoxes involving a falsity predicate and its application to argumentation frameworks ⋮ A UNIFIED THEORY OF TRUTH AND PARADOX ⋮ Propositional discourse logic ⋮ A GRAPH-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE SEMANTIC PARADOXES ⋮ SUPERVALUATION ON TREES FOR KRIPKE’S THEORY OF TRUTH

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