Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Jump liars and Jourdain's card via the relativized T-scheme
- Truth values, neither-true-nor-false, and supervaluations
- Two types of deflationism
- Supervaluation fixed-point logics of truth
- What is a truth value and how many are there?
- Notes on naive semantics
- Grounding, dependence, and paradox
- Semantic closure
- Languages with self-reference. I: Foundations (or: We can have everything in first-order logic!)
- How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result
- A syntactic theory of belief and action
- Some remarks on extending and interpreting theories with a partial predicate for truth
- Partial models and logic programming
- An axiomatic approach to self-referential truth
- Languages with self-reference. II: Knowledge, belief, and modality
- I'm OK if you're OK: On the notion of trusting commmunication
- Generalizations of Tarski's fixed point theorem for order varieties of complete meet semilattices
- Bilattices and the theory of truth
- Non-monotonic logic. I
- A note on three-valued logic and Tarski theorem on truth definitions
- Partial inductive definitions
- Logic, sets, and mathematics
- Partially interpreted relations and partially interpreted quantifiers
- Quantified Quinean S5
- Property theory: The type-free approach \(v\). The Church approach
- Dynamic semantics and circular propositions
- Truth and the liar in De Morgan-valued models
- Descending chains and the contextualist approach to semantic paradoxes
- A theory of truth that prefers falsehood
- A logical semantics for depth-first Prolog with ground negation
- Some supervaluation-based consequence relations
- Why the liar does not matter
- Fixpoint semantics for logic programming a survey
- Saving the truth schema from paradox
- Supervaluation-style truth without supervaluations
- A propositional theory of truth
- Truth, partial logic and infinitary proof systems
- An algebraic view of super-Belnap logics
- Unified grounding
- A new semantics for vagueness
- Provably true sentences across axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth
- Paradox and logical revision. A short introduction
- Norms of truth and logical revision
- A note on contraction-free logic for validity
- Denial and disagreement
- Paradox, repetition, revenge
- Self-referential propositions
- Three questions for minimalism
- This is not an instance of (E)
- Stone-type representations and dualities for varieties of bisemilattices
- On the costs of nonclassical logic
- On the status of reflection and conservativity in replacement theories of truth
- Time and logic: A calculus of binary events
- A revenge-immune solution to the semantic paradoxes
- Possible-worlds semantics for modal notions conceived as predicates
- Deflationary truth and the Liar
- Key notions of Tarski's methodology of deductive systems
- Vagueness and blurry sets
- Truth and paradox
- Mechanism, truth, and Penrose's new argument
- A contextual-hierarchical approach to truth and the liar paradox
- The strong completeness of a system based on Kleene's strong three-valued logic
- Levels of truth
- An approach to uncertainty via sets of truth values
- Arithmetic with satisfaction
- A contingent Russell's paradox
- A new conditional for naive truth theory
- In defense of logical universalism: taking issue with Jean van Heijenoort
- How truth behaves when there's no vicious reference
- Structural weakening and paradoxes
- Disquotation and infinite conjunctions
- Revision without revision sequences: self-referential truth
- Ungroundedness in Tarskian languages
- Notes on Leitgeb's Ruitenburg
- The implicit commitment of arithmetical theories and its semantic core
- Paradoxical hypodoxes
- Minimalism, supervaluations and fixed points
- Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox
- A note on Horwich's notion of grounding
- Non-deterministic logic of informal provability has no finite characterization
- Generalizing Montague's theorem on recursive definitions
- Cut elimination for systems of transparent truth with restricted initial sequents
- Validities, antivalidities and contingencies: a multi-standard approach
- Non-reflexivity and revenge
- Truth and the philosophy of mathematics
- An update of Tarski: two usages of the word ``true
- Did Descartes make a diagonal argument?
- Outline of an intensional theory of truth
- On cut-elimination arguments for axiomatic theories of truth
- A unified approach to semantic and soritical paradoxes
- A pragmatic dissolution of Curry's paradox
- A remark on probabilistic measures of coherence
- Tree-like proof systems for finitely-many valued non-deterministic consequence relations
- Comparing more revision and fixed-point theories of truth
- Mathematical perspectives on liar paradoxes
- Speech acts, categoricity, and the meanings of logical connectives
- Reference, paradoxes and truth
- Noncontractive classical logic
- Naive infinitism: the case for an inconsistency approach to infinite collections
- Book review: Leon Horsten, The Tarskian turn. Deflationism and axiomatic truth.
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