Outline of a Theory of Truth
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Publication:4523164
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- Paths to triviality
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- Tarski's theorem and the extensionality of truth
- Truth without contra(di)ction
- Intuitionism and the liar paradox
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- Notes on naive semantics
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- Bunder's paradox
- A constructive interpretation of the full set theory
- An update of Tarski: two usages of the word ``true
- Platitudes against paradox
- Logical predictivism
- Alethic reference
- Reference and truth
- Henkin quantifiers and the definability of truth
- Equivalences for truth predicates
- Can deflationists be dialetheists?
- Truth and meaning
- A graph-theoretic analysis of the semantic paradoxes
- Partial models and logic programming
- John McCarthy's legacy
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