Outline of a Theory of Truth
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Publication:4523164
DOI10.2307/2024634zbMath0952.03513OpenAlexW46517763WikidataQ56050630 ScholiaQ56050630MaRDI QIDQ4523164
Publication date: 8 January 2001
Published in: The Journal of Philosophy (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/dc290f09d49238ee5972aef045f20207806c737d
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